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Summary findings
Easterly  examines  a range of cross-sectional  variation  in  Large  positive  residuals  such as those associated  with
performance  and policies  for evidence  on what  the Four's high performance  have  historically  been
distinguishes  successes  from failures,  transitory.  The stratospheric  trajectory  of the Four
At about 6 percent, the growth rates  of the Four Tigers  should be heading  back  toward earth soon, says  Easterly
-Hong  Kong,  the Republic  of Korea,  Singapcre,  and  What may be unusual  about the Four's success  is that
Taiwan  (Chiina)  - are among  the largest  outliers in any  they were all in one region.  At least casually,  the Asian
study  of growth. Tnis is not surprising,  says  Easterly.  The  successe-  look a lot like  growth radiating  from poles,
Four Tigers  are  Tigers  because  their grow.h rate was  with  Japan followed  by the Gang  of Four, followed  by
high. The Four generally  have  large positive  residuals  in  China,  Thailand, Malaysia,  and Indonesia.
growth regressions,  but Easterly  argues  that this is not  The great success  of the Gang of Four does not imply  a
surprising  for observations  that  were  known in advance  blanket  endorsement  of all  their policies  - they may
to be at the top of the sample.  have made  mistakes  that were more than offset by other
But  growth regressions  and, more generally,  good policies  and, probably  at least in part, by good luck.
quantitative  measures  of 'policies" are not very  It is disturbing  how large  and transitory the
successful  at picking  out the Gang of Four  as "most  likely  unexplained  eement is in economic  success.  Perhaps  the
to succeed.' Most observers  before  the "miracle"  were  best way to think about good policies  is that they make
pcssimistic  about East  Asia.  success  likely  sooner cr later.
The Four are not nearly  as superlative  in policies  and  When all is said  and done, the story of the East  Asian
other country  characteristics  as they are in per capita  successes  is consistent  with the prosaic  fundamentals:
growth rates.  investment,  education,  financial  depth, and low budget
deficits.  In these areas, the Four were above  average.
This  paper  - a product  of the Macroeconomics  and Growth  Division,  Folicy  ResearchDepartment  - was  presented  at NBER's
fourth  Annual  East  Asian  Seminar  on Economics  in San  Francisco  in  June 1993.  The study  was  funded  by the Bank's  Research
Support  Budget  under  the research  project  'How Do National  Policies  Affect  l.ong-Run  Growth?"  (RPO  676-66).  Copies  of this
paper  are  available  free  from  the World  Bank,  1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Rebecca  Mar-in,  room
NI 1-043,  extension  39026  (39  pages).  Fcbruary  1994.
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I. Introduction
Like everyone  else, economists  find success  irresistible. The spectacular  success  of the East
Asian economies  has attracted  a huge literature  to explain tie success and to examine  the prospects for
imitation  by others. The leading actors in this development  drama are the four most successful  of the
East Asian LDC's: Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore,  and Taiwan (China)  -- known by such encomiums
as the Gang of Four, the Four Dragons, the Four Tigers, the Asian Miracles, and the Newly
Industrialized  Countries  (NIC's).  The Four have been  used to support each development  school's
favorite prescriptions,  ranging from free market outward orientation  to aggressive  trade intervention.'
It is obvious why the story of the Four is so tantalizing:  if only their success  could be
understood  and replicated in other LDC's, the development  problem would be solved. The metaphors
for the Four recognize  that replication  is not so easy.  "Miracles"  are unique (the Red Sea was parted
once); "tigers" are an endangered  species. As Lucas (1993) says, "simply  advising  a society  to 'follow
the Korean model' is a little like advising  an aspiring  basketball  player to 'follow the Micha.l Jordan
model.' "
Nevertheless,  economists  find it much more appealing  to study what the successes  did right
than what failures did wrong: from 1969  to the present  there have been 717 articles  on Singapore  in
economics  journals. 2 On the Central African  Republic, a country  of similar population  size but
oppo!  ite performance,  the number  of articles  over this period was: 1.  It's not really clear why !rrge
positive  outliers should contain more information  than large negative  outliers.
The alternative  to case studies is to examine  the entire range of cross-sectional  variation  of
performance  and policies for evidence  on what distinguishes  successes  from failures. This approach
was already well-established  in the development  literature (for example,  the large literature  on exports
and economic  growth of Balassa  (1978), Feder (1983)  and others), but has taken on truly mammoth
proportions with the advent  of the "new  growth literature" inspired  by Romer  (1986).  Numerous
empirical studies have examined  the relationships  between  policies and growth predicted  by "new"
growth models  as well as by extended "old" growth models. The studies show strong associatio'ls5
between country  characteristics  and growth (e.g. Barro (1991)), although  these relationships  are very
sensitive  to the choice  of right-hand-side  control variables (Levine  arid Renelt (1992)).
A natural exercise is to examine  to what extent this large empirical  literature can cxplain the
success  of the Four. 3 The Four's per capita  growth rates of around 6 percent will be among  the largest
outliers in any study of growth.  This is not surprising: the Four Tigers are Tigers because  their
growth rate was high. 4 This sample  selection  problem  bedevils  the analysis  of the Gang of Four: we
cannot  say how  special are the Four because  they were selected  because they are special. The paper
will examine  the place of the Four in growth regressions  keeping in mind  this selection  problem. The
Four generally
have large  positive residuals  in growth regressions, but the paper will argue that this is not surprising
for observations  that were known in advance  to be at the top of the sample. Growth  regressions and,
more generally, quantitative  measures  of "policies"  are not very successful  at picking out the Four as
most likely to succeed.
The second, related issue to be examined  is to what extent omitted, country-specific  fixed
factors explain the success  of the Dragons. This is the same as asking how permanent  is the success of
the Asian miracles. Cross-country  evidence  will show that large positive  residuals like those
associated  with the Dragons  have historically  been transitory. The natural conclusion  is that the
miraculous  growth rates of the Dragons  are unliKely  to continue.
II.  The Gang of Four in Growth  Regressions
We examine  in this section  how the Gang of Four enter into growth regressions. We take two
well-known  empirical  studies as a point of departure: Barro (1991) and Levine and Renelt (1992) (the
latter unfortunately  omits Taiwan (China)). For each regression, we will examine  how much  the right-
hand-side  variables  are successful in predicting  the high growth of the Gang of Four.  Equivalently,  we
will ask whether  the  Four were as highly ranked in their policies and other country characteristics  as
they were in their growth rates.
Table I shows the ranking  of the Four in the right-hand  side variables  from the Barro (1991)
regression. Some of the policy rankings are considerably  less than superlative. All of the Four are in6
the worst half on a measure  of price distortion: the deviation  of the investmnent  goods price in dollars
from the U.S. pL  ce.  Hong Kong  and Singapore  have highly stable political systems, but not so
Taiwan (China)  and Korea. Primary education  is exceptional  in Singapore, but only slightly above
average in the other three.  Government  consumption  is adversely  high in Taiwan (China)  (whose
manv public enterprises  are notoriouv  for overstaffing  and inefficiency  -- see Liu (1993)). Initial
income is low in Korea and Taiwan (China), so that they benefited  from the tendency of poor nations
to grow faster (Barro and Sala-i-Martin  (1992)), but Hong Kong  and Singapore  were relatively rich.
Altogether,  the predicted  value of growth from the right-hand  side variables is among  the highest in the
sample  for Singapore  and Hong Kong; Taiwan (China)  is less clearly picked out as exceptional,  while
Korea  just barely makes  the top quartile. To put it more graphically, there were 27 countries  that w, e
predicted  to do better than Korea, including  such notable non-successes  as Guyana, Jamaica, and
Uruguay.
All of the Four Tigers have large positive residuals  of two or three percentage  points of
growth. 5 The positive residuals  are unsurprising: observations  at the upper end of the sample  are
likely to have positive residuals. To illustrate  this, suppose  that growth had been completely  random
around a constant  term. If we had regressed a large sample  of such randomly  determined  growth rates
on a constant  term, then by definition  the four largest growth rates would have the four largest
residuals in such a regressi-n. If we have a model  with some predictive  power, then the countries  with
the largest growth rates are likely to have abovc  average values  both of the predicted  value of growth
an]J  of the random error term. 6
Another way of illustrating  how poorly predicted  is the growth of the Four in this regression is
to calculate  the probability  that a given country would achieve  a "miracle", where a miracle is defined
as growth greater than 5 percent per capita.  There were seven such miracles  in the Barro data: Japan,
Malta, Gabon, and the Gang of Four.  The probability  of reaching such a growth rate is calculated  as
the probability  of a sufficiently  large realization  of the error term such that the fitted value of growth
plus the error term is greater than 5 percent. 7 A country withi  favorable  characteristics  will need only
a small realization  of the error term to reach "miraculous"  growth rates, while a country with highly7
unfavorable  characteristics  would need an improbably  high realization  to attain a miracle. Again, we
see in Table 2 that the Barro regiession is good at picking out the success  of Japan and Singapore,  less
so the success of Hong Kong  and Taiwan (China), and much less so the miracle of Korea.
Interpreting  Korea's h.,'n residual literally is an interesting  thought experiment.  According  to
T'able  2, Korea had only about a one in 11 chance  of attaining  the miraculous  growth rates that it in
fact attained. There would  then be nothing  special about Korea -- it would  just be the ecol.omy  that
got lucky out of a larger set of countries with good but not great economic  policies. These odds of a
miracle still reflect relatively favorable  conditins for growth in Korea; by contrast, Chad -- with
adverse  characteristics  for growth, to put it mildly -- had only a I in 100,000  chance of attaining
"miraculous"  growt.  The "luck"  view would accord with some of the new theoretical  views of
growth that stress multiple  equilibria: countries  with very similar characteristics  could have widely
divergent outcomes.8
We could also read the failure of the growth regression  to pick out the Gang of Four as yet
another indictment  of cross-section  growth regressions. As in the old growth models,  the residual is a
measure  of our ignoratnce.  We might hope that other plausible specifications  would drastically reduce
the large error term. There are, however, two reasons why this is unlikely. One is that, as we will see
in the next section, the feasible R-squared  that one can attain with permanent  country  characteristics  in
cross-section  regressions  is bounded  by the high time-series  instabilit- of growth rates. The other, as
we will see now! is that other specifications  do not appreciably  improve our ability to explain cross-
coun.ry variation  in general or the Gang of Four in particular.
The other pre-determined  specification  we examine  is the core regression  of Levine-Renelt
(1992), which was found to be reasonably  robust. 9 Table 3 shows how the Four (actually  the Three,
since Taiwan (China)  is omitted  from the sample)  rank according  to the right-hand  side variables of
this regression. The most significant  difference  from the Barro regression is the addition  of
investment,  where Singapore  and Hong Kong outrank  most of the world, and Korea is also well above
average.  1 0 With investment  added, the residual  for Singapore  is much lower than in the Barro
regression. This is reminiscent  of the results of Young (1992)  that total factor productivity  growth (i.e.8
growth controlling  for capital and labor growth) is close to zero in Singapore. Like the Barro
regression, the Levine-Renelt  iegression is fairly successful  at picking out Singapore  as most likely to
succeed,  and less so at picking out Hong Kong  and Korea. Sixtetn countries  are predicted  to do better
than Hong Kong, including  Jamaica  (aga'n) and Surinanie.
To conclude this section, the ranking  f the Four Dragons  for othor variab!es  common  in
growth regressions  are considered. Table 4 confirms  again that the Foujr  generally  had policies and
other characteristics  more favorable for growth than th_.  average, but are by no means  as extreme
outliers in policies as they are in growth. The Four have completely  avoided wars over 1960-89.  but
here they are tied with the three quarters  of ti-  sample  that was also at peace. Government  spending on
education  is low in Hong Konig  and unexceptional  in the other three.  Public investment  is very
different among  the Four: very low in Hong Kong, below average in Korea, and above average in
Taiwan (China). As frequently  pointed out, inequality  is low in the Four and openness is high. The
Financial  system is exceptionally  deep in Singapore  and less so in Korea. The black market premium is
absent in Taiwan (China)  and Hong Kong, but Pontrivial  in Korea and Singapore. Macroeconomic
stability is exceptional in Singapore -- low government deficits, low inflation -- but not in Hong Kong
or Korea.  I  I Interestingly,  the cerms  of trade changes in Hong Kong  and Singapore  have bcen among
the most unfavorable  in the world.
The last part of table 4 shows other performance  indicators. Private investment  (either a result
or a cause of growth) is exceptionally  high in all of the Four except Taiwan (China). The
improvement in social indicators -- specifically the under-5 mortality rate -- is among the largest in the
sample, with the curioLis  exception  of Korea. Consumption  growth per capita is not as impressive  as
overall per capita growth in Korea and Singapore,  reflecting  again  the effect of high rates of capital
accumulation. The Four's superiority  of performance  is not completely  robust to other performance
indicators.
W'hile  the Four Dragons  do not seem  to be striking outliers according  to the right-hand  side
variables considered here, there are no doubt other characteristics where they would be found to be
exceptional; such characteristics could thus "explain'  tilieir  ;'igh growth.  The problem with such9
explanations  is that they are too easy to find.  It's not that hard to find characteristics  that four
countries have in common, like a "`Canfucian  work ethic" or high population  density. Such ex-post
"explanaticns"  are of dubious value. The advantage  of pre-  determined  specifications  (like the Barro
(1991)  .nd Levire-Renelt  (1992)) is that they were not chosen specifically  to expiain the Four
Dragons.
(f  course, the most obvious  trait the Four have in common  are that they are in the same
region:  East 4sia.  The more recent success  of other East Asian  economies  like China, Thailand,
Malaysia,  and Indonesia  ha ra added to the case for East Asian exceptionialism.  However, the selection
bias problem  may be infecting  even our regional definitions. Development  textbooks  written before
the onset of the ' jast Asia miracle" used a regional  breakdown  of Asia/Africa,Lat.n  America  (see for
example  Kuznets  (1966), pp. 360-61; Meier (1964), p. 6; Hagen (1968), p. 23; Higgins (1959),  p. 10;
Enke (1963), p. 48).  The "East Asia" regional  definition  apparently  came into use among development
economists  after the divergence  in growth rates became  evident.
Even if East Asia is a coherent geographic  region, there are other coherent regional
breakdowns  that could have been used. The choice of which to u^e is partly endogenous. For example,
East and West Africa  could be distinguished,  but usually  are not because  they are not dramatical!;
different in performance. Drawing  the boundaries  of East Asia is also tricky: is Myanmar  (Burma)
included?  Is Malaysia?  Does  onomic  performance  influence  where we draw the boundary?
Even if exaggerated  by endogenous  regional definition,  i  still seems unlikely that the
concentration  of success in (East?)  Asia occurred by chance. It is surprising that the literature does not
make more of this concentratl.. (other than to speculate  about  cultural or other fixed regional traits
supposedly  favorable  for growth). The alternative  explanation  to a fixed Asia effect is that success is
contagious  across borders. DeLong  and Summers (1991)  tested formally for spatial correlation  of
residuals in a growth regression, but failed to find any correlation based on physical proximity.
However, Chua (1993) presents  evidence  that spillovers  exist from countries' rigit-hand side variables
(particularly  investment)  to their neighbors'  growth performance.10
Contagion  seems like a rnore likeiy explanation  than a fixed Asia effect, for the simple reason
that Asia's success is relatively recent. As the next section shows, cross-country  evidence  suggests
tiat episodes  of success  are short-lived,  and so fixed effects like "cultural  predisposition  to growth" do
not fit the evidence  for either regions or countries.
III.  Is the Dragons'  success  transitory?
A recent paper (Easterly, Kremer. Pritchett,  and Summers (1993), henceforth  EKPS) found
that success as measured  by rapid growth is surprisingly  transitory. The correlation  of growth rates
across successive  decades  or even longer periods is only about .2 to .3, implying  that oaly 20 to 30
percent of cross-country  differences  in growth rates persist from one decade to the next. The graph
shown here, reproduced  from EKPS, shows least-squares  per worker growth (from Summers-Heston
(1991)) in 1974-88  against  growth in 1960-73.  The dotted lines  show the medians  in each period.
Many  countries are in the off-diagonal  quadrants:  successes  one period are disappointments  the next,
and vice versa.  The boxes indicate  the top and bottom deciles in each period. Only four countries  are
in the top decile in both periods: Botswana  and three of the Gang of Four.  The fourth gang member  --
Hong Kong -- just misses out on the top decile in the first period. The Four are notable as consistent
performers  (with tiny Botswana)  in the postwar data.
How unusual is it that four countries would appear in the top decile in two successive  periods?
EKPS show that the correlation  coefficient  of growth rates across periods can be interpreted  as the
ratio of the permanent  cross-sectior,al  variance  in growth rates to the sum of the cross-sectional
variance  aned  the time series variance  in growth rates.  A correlation  coefficient  of growth rates across
periods of .33 implies that a third of the total variance  of growth rates is explained  by permanent
cross-country  differences  as opposed  to period to period variation. EKPS show that this also implies  a
limit to the R-squared  in pure cross section regressions  that will be realized  with permanent  country
characteristics  on the right hand side -- persistence  of 0.33 implies that the upper limit on the R-
squared is about 0.6 with cross-section  regressions  covering 30 years.  We perform an illustrative
Monte Carlo simulation  of the variance  structure implied  by a cross-ptriod correlation  of 1/3.12
Twelve out of fifty simulations  show 4 or more countries in the top decile  across successive  periods.I I
While not the most likely outcome, it is not all that unilsulal  to ftind  4 consistently  positive ouitliers  even
with relatively srnall  permanent  differences  in cross-coUntry  performiance.
Like everyone  else, the Four NIC's cannot  COLIunt  on success lasting very long. 'I'he  pattern ot
low persistence  of growth rates suggests  thiat  their growth is likely to fall in the 90s,  13
Before the miracle. historical  antecedents  for the Fouir  Dragons
While the success  of the Four Dragons  now seems to have been written in the stars,  the
Four's promise was not so apparent beforehand. Failure to recognize  the low persistence  of growth
performance  often leads  to overestimation  of the prospects of countries  that have been doing well, and
the underestimation  of countries  doing badly.
As table 5 shows, performance  of Korea  and
Taiwan (China) -- and of other Asian miracles -- was not so stellar before the miracle.  None of the
later success  stories had exceptional  growth  over the first part of the century (historical  growth
estimates - which of course should be taken with a grain of salt -- are from Maddison  (1989)).
It is therel7ore  not surprising that most observers before the miracle were pessimistic  about East
Asia. Enke (1963)  presents a table of factors  favorable  or unfavorable  for development,  reproduced
here as table 6. He ranks four developing  regions: Latin America,  sub-Sahara  Africa (sic), Middle
East, and Southeast  Asia. By the latter, he means all of Asia east of the Middle East and south of
Siberia.
Southeast  Asia was at the bottom  of the list in all three of his categories.  It was the poorest region,
which was thought to be unfavorable  for growth because  of the low savings rates (!) of poor countries;
it had the highest population  pressure; it had the culture most unfavorable  for development.  The latter
is particularly interesting  given all that has subsequently  been written  about the "Confucian  Ethic"
(Kahn (1979), MacFarquar  (1980)). Such an ethic was not evident before 1960. An economist  in 1952
commented  sadly that "the age-long  influence  of the West...  failed with only few exceptions  to instill its
economic  activity and enterprise into the minds and habits of these peoples. The Western  apparatus  of
...  production remained a&  ...  indigestible element in Southeast Asia ...  the economic energy for a
vigorous resurgence  {  was  } lacking."  1412
Nor were the prospects  of individual  countries clear ex ante. The first World Bank mission to
Korea in the early 1960s  described  the development  program as ludicrously  optimistic: "there  can be
no doubt that this development  program {GDP  growth of 7.1 percent of 1962-66}  far exceeds  the
potential of the Korean economy... It is inconceivable  that exports will rise as much as  projected." (In
the event, Korean growth was 7.3 percent over that period.) Prominent  academic  economists  also did
not detect East Asia's promise.  Chenery  and Strout forecast  in the early 60's that growth in India and
Pakistan  over 1962-76  would  exceed that of Korea. Rosenstein-Rodan  at the same time predicted  that
Sri Lanka would  have a higher per capita income  than Taiwan (China)  or Korea by 1976. Hong Kong
and Singapore,  according  to the same predictions,  would be left in the dust by Argentina  and
Colombia. Myrdal worried that Singapore  "has its own potentially  explosive  problems  [of rapid
population  growth], which threatens  a mounting  unemployment  burden."', 5
By contrast, the World Bank's economic  report in 1957 was optimistic  about the Philippines,
which had "achieved  a position in the Far East second only to Japan..  .The prospects ... for sustained
long-term  growth are good." An even more promising  case was Burma,  wh;^h in 1958  was said by the
Bank to have "made  remarkable  economic  progress...  Burma's long-run potential  compares  favorably
with those of other countries in South East Asia."  16 (In the event, Burma  (Myanmar)  and the
Philippines  have been among  the few poor performers  in East Asia.)
Asia's prospects  looked poor compared  to those of Africa, where the World Bank's chief
economist in 1967  predicted "the economic  future before  the end of the century can be bright". He
listed seven Afiican countries that "clearly  have the potential  to reach or surpass a 7 percent rate of
growth". All of those he listed  had negative  per capita growth over 1970-88.17
The postwar doubts about Asia's prospects echoed  earlier doubts about the most famous Asian
success story. Japan.  In the 19th  century, the first Western  visitors to Japan held out little hope for the
country's future: "wealthy  we do not think it will ever become:  the advantages  conferred  by
Nature...  and the love of indolence  and pleasure  of the people  themselves  forbid it...In this part of the
world principles. established  and recognized  in the West, appear to lose whatever  virtue and vitality
they originally possessed  and to tenid fatally towards \weediness  and corruption." 1813
Persistence  of the 7igers' residuals
We have seen that the Four Tigers have large positive residuals in growth regressions, and that
their performance  is consistent  since 1960. A way of probing deeper into both of these facts is to
examine  the residuals  of the Tigers in pooled cross-section,  decade regressions,  where each countr)
will have up to three decade-average  observations  (for the 60s, 70s and 80s).  Regressions  will again
be run using roughly the Barro (1991) and Levine-Renelt  (1992)  specifications. We will examine  the
robustness  of the results to alternative  specifications  of the dependent  variable: Summers-Heston  versus
World Bank growth rates, and per capita versus per worker GDP growth rates.
The regressions  are reported in the appendix. The "Barro" versions regress decade-average
growth rates on time dummies  for the 60s and 70s, per capita income  at the beginning  of the decade,
primary and s:.  -. ary enrollment  ratios at the beginning  of each decade, the average share of
government  consumption  in GDP (decade  average), and the decade-average  black market premium
(which is a substitute  for Barro's price distortion variable, since  the latter is not available  separately
for decades). The "Barro" regression  uses Summers-Heston  (1991) GDP data for two alternative
definitions  of the dependent  variable: least-squares  per capita  growth and least-squares  per worker
growth. 19 The "Levine-Renelt"  regression has as right-hand-side  variables  the investment  rate over
the decade, secondary  enrollment  at the beginning  of decade, population  growth (or labor force growth
when per worker growth is the dependent  variable), initial per capita income  in the decade, and decade
dummies. The dependent  variable is decade-long  least-squares  growth for either GDP per capita or
GDP per worker, using World Bank GDP data.
Table 7 shows  the resulting residuals  for the four alternative  specifications. The residuals  stay
consistently  high and positive in the Levine-Renelt  regression with per capita growth rates, but
somewhat  less so in the Barro regression  with per capita growth rates. The residuals  are more
unstable  when per worker instead  of per capita  growth rates are used: Singapore  has residuals  close to
zero for 2 out of the 3 decades in both Barro and Levine-Renelt  per worker regressions. The other
three Tigers also have erratic residuLls  in the Barro per worker regression. 2014
What is the tendency  of residuals  to persist for the entire sample? EKPS showed  that the low
persistence of growth rates is not explained  by variations in policies or other country  characteristics. It
follows that the persistence  of residuals in pooled  growth regressions  will be low.  In the Barro
regression with per worker growth rates, for example, the cross-decade  correlation  of the residuals  is
only 0. 1 and is statistically  insignificant. An equivalent  way of stating this low persistence  is that
residuals  for all countries will tend to move back toward zero (i.e. there is regression  . ;nean,
where the mean by construction  is zero).  With a cross-decade  correlation  of only 0. 1,  I  or
90% of the residual  will tend to disappear in the following  period. 21  The graph shows u'  as the
tendency  for the change in the residual  from the first to the second decade  to be inversely  relat.ed  to the
residual in the first decade. We see in the graph that the Four Tigers fit snugly into the overall
pattern: the evanescence  of the unexplained  component  of success. 22
The behavior  of the Tigers' residuals  (and those of the rest of the sample) implies  two
important  conclusions.  One is that the residuals  are reduced, and more of the Tigers' success
explained,  with per worker rather than per capita growth rates.  Part of the success  was simply  due to
faster labor force  than population  growth (especially  notable in Singapore). The second is that the
residuals  in the sample in general are highly unstable  and transitory -- country fixed effects  do not
seem to be an important  part of the explanation  of the part of growth unexplained  by investment,
education,  price distortions,  etc.  The low persistence  of the residuals  would  rule out those
unobservable  factors  that are relatively  fixed over time -- like culture, institutions, quality of
government  -- as a large part of the explanation  of growth differences. 23
IV. Conclusions  and suggestions  for further research
Nothing in this paper should be taken as denigrating  the success  of Hong Kong, Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan (China). However  it was achieved,  the rapid growth of these Four is one of
the most remarkable  success stories in economic  history.
But what should we make of the fact that a significant  part of the Dragons' success is
unexplained? This paper argues: not much. The Four were selected  because  they were highly
successful. If there is any random  variation in our models  at all, then we should not be surprised  that15
the strongest positive  outliers in growth have a positive growth residual. The quest to explain the
success  of the Four is bound to be at least partly futile. The literature has often been unable to resist
the temptation  to read too much into East Asia's success. T he great success of the Ciang  of Four does
not imply  a blanket  endorsement  of all of their policies -- they may have made mistakes  that were more
than offset by other good policies -- and probably at least in part, good luck.  As in the story of the
man turning 100 who attributes  his longevity  to generous consumption  of whiskey, not all of the
Dragons' habits are fit for imitation.
What are the implications  for the Dragons  of the low persistence  of growth rates? It is true that
the Four were more consistent  good performers  than almost anyone  else in the sample. It is also true
that one would  expect some small number of countries  to be consistent  good performers  even with only
a modest  tendency  toward persistence  of growth differences. The cross-country  evidence  suggests  that
the stratospheric  trajectory of the Four should be heading  back towards earth soon.
What may be unusual about the Four's success is that they were all in one region. The spatial
association  of success with East Asia (even if the category "East Asia" is partly endogenous)  would
imply that more attention should be paid to economic  geography,  as argued by Krugman  (1992). The
Asian successes  look at least casually a lot like growth radiating  from poles, with Japan followed  by
the Gang of Four, followed  by China, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.  WAang  and Mody (1993)
have shown how there are spillovers  from Taiwan (China)  and Hong Kong to coastal provinces  in
China. Chua (1993)  shows that countries benefit from their neighbors' good policies. It may be that
the "something  extra" in East Asia is partly the mutually  beneficial  set of spillovers  from high
investment  and other favorable  cour.try  characteristics.  But this is in itself not sufficient  to explain
concentration  of success  -- what is also needed  is that neighbors influence  each other to adopt high
investment  rates or other "good" characteristics  (or that growth itself spills across borders). While  past
attempts  at identifying  spatial correlation  based on physical  proximity have had no success  (DeLong
and Summers  (1991)), it may be that more complicated  interactions  between  countries remain to be
studied.16
Another geographic  twist is to notice that Singapore  and Hong Kong are really more like cities
than countries. Cities are more subject  than countries  to forces like sectoral shifts from agriculture  to
industry, and externalities  from migration  and urbanization  (which would plausibly  have strong effects
on cities' per capita  growth as well as their population  growth rates).24 One might th -k accordingly
that cities have a higher variance  of per capita growth rates than do countries, and wculd be thus more
likely to have large positive outliers (as well as negative  ones). Mean per capita growth rates of all
cities may  also be higher than that of rural areas. It follows  that the natural comparators  to the success
of Hong Kong and Singapore  would be other cities' economic  growth, not growth rates of countries. 25
Other city "miracles"  could be hidden in the data by aggregation  within  countries. For example,  the
Anaheim,  California  metropolitan  area (1970  population: 1.4 million)  had per capita growth of 5.9
percent in the 1950s  (when U.S. growth was only 1.2 percent). But Anaheim  did not thereby  enter the
lore of economic  miracles  (Anaheim's  success probably  had more to do with the opening  of Disneyland
in 1955  than with "good  policies" by the city fathers). 26 Data on per capita income  growth of
developing  country metropolises  are unfortunately  hard to come by.
Finally, when all is said and done, the story of the East Asian successes  is consistent  with the
old prosaic  fundamentals  -- investment,  education,  financial  depth, low budget deficits. The Four were
above average in these areas, and regressions  do show quantitativelv  and statistically  significant  effects
of policies on growth. This cross-country  evidence  has at least as much  to say as the case studies that
attempt to decipher  the meaning  of the Four's large growth residuals.
Perhaps  the best way to think about  good policies is that they make success  likely sooner or
later. Policymakers  should be convinced  by looking  at cross-country  evidence  that it is a lot better to
make miracles  feasible  through good policy than to make them impossible  by bad policy.  But the
policymakers'  lot is not an easy one: it is disturbing  how large and transitory is the unexplained
element in economic  success.17
Appendix: Pooled versions of Barro and Levine-Renelt  (1992) regressions
(1) Levine-Renelt  with World Bank per capita growth  rates
LS  //  Dependent  Variable  is GYP
Number  of observations:  306
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  0.0123264  0.0165139  0.7464239  0.4560
DUIM60  0.0295255  0.0032858  8.9858686  0.0000
DUM70  0.0191983  0.0030524  6.2896584  0.0000
INV  0.1492889  0.0188816  7.9065956  0.0000
SEC  0.0253555  0.0094359  2.6871204  0.0076
GPO  -0.3279395  0.1634988  -2.0057602  0.0458
LRGDP  -0.0052455  0.0023868  -2.1977155  0.0287
R-squared  0.365726  Mean  of dependent  var  0.020583
Adjusted  R-squared  0.352998  S.D.  of  dependent  var  0.025716
S.E.  of  regression  0.020685  Sum  of  squared  resid  0.127934
Log  likelihood  756.1182  F-statistic  28.73422
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
Variables  (decades  are 1960-69, 1970-79,  and 1980-89):
GYP  Per capita growth, compound  rate by decade (World Bank National Accounts).
DUM60  Dummy variable  for decade  of 1960s  = 1, otherwise =0
DUM70  Dummy variable  for decade  of 1970s = 1, otherwise =0
INV  Investment/GDP,  average for decade, World Bank National Accounts
SEC  Secondary  school enrollment  ratio, beginning  of decade (Barro 1991)
GPO  Growth  of population,  by decade (World  Bank Social  Indicators)
LRGDP  Log of income (Summers-Heston  (1991), initial year of decade(2)  Levine-Renelt  with  World Bank per worker  growth  rates
LS // Dependent  Variable  is LGPW  Number  of observations:  296
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  0.0246784  0.0154730  1.5949396  0.1118
DUM60  0.0299728  0.0032674  9.1733685  0.0000
DUM70  0.0154288  0.0029886  5.1624633  0.0000
INV  0.1542238  0.0188695  8.1731867  0.0000
SEC  0.0220750  0.0086438  2.5538607  0.0112
GRLF  -0.4920195  0.1309579  -3.7570816  0.0002
LRGDP  -0.0066414  0.0023710  -2.8010763  0.0054
R-squared  0.373179  Mean  of dependent  var  0.017675
Adjusted R-squared  0.360166  S.D. of dependent var  0.025384
S.E. of regression  0.020305  Sum of squared resid  0.119148
Log likelihood  737.0214  F-statistic  28.67614
Durbin-Watson stat  1.914646  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
LGPW Least-squares  growth rate by decade, GDP per worker (World  Bank National  Accounts)
DUM60 Dummy  variable  for decade of 1960s  = 1, otherwise =0
DUM70 Dummy  variable  for decade of 1970s  = 1, otherwise =0
INV  Investment/GDP,  average for decade, World Bank National  Accounts
SEC  Secondary  school enrollment  ratio, beginning  of decade (Barro 1991)
GRLF  Least-squares  growth rate of labor force by decade (World Bank Social Indicators)
LRGDP  Log of income (Summers-Heston  (1991), initial year of decade19
(3) Pooled "Barro"  regression  using per worker growth  rates
LS  //  ependent  Variable  is SLPI1
Number  of observations:  303
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  0.1364398  0.0209900  6.5002292  0.0000
LGDPPC  -0.0188251  0.0030151  -6.2436568  0.0000
PRIM  0.0001987  6.996E-05  2.8403036  0.0048
SEC  0.0003837  9.947E-05  3.8574606  0.0001
SGOV  -0.0741720  0.0219419  -3.3803750  0.0008
BLCK  -0.0297244  0.0044487  -6.6816356  0.0000
DUM60  0.0271613  0.0039898  6.8076529  0.0000
DUM70  0.0198466  0.0035927  5.5241248  0.0000
R-squared  0.363949  Mean  of dependent  var  0.017640
Adjusted  R-squared  0.348856  S.D.  of dependent  var  0.030669
S.E.  of regression  0.024748  Sum  of squared  resid  0.180679
Log  likelihood  694.9134  F-statistic  24.11416
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
Variable  definitions:
SLPW  Summers-Heston  (1991)  least-squares  growth per worker, decade average
LGDPPC  Log of initial per capita income, beginning  of decade (Summers-Heston  (1991))
PRIM  Primary  enrollment,  beginning  of decade (World  Bank)
SEC  Secondary  enrollment, beginning  of decade (World  Bank)
SGOV  Share of government  consumption  in GDP (Suminers-Heston  (1991))
BLCK  Black market premium, average over decade (Levine-Renelt  (1992), World  Bank)
DUM60  Dummy  variable for decade of 1960s
DUM70  Dummy  variable for decade of 1970s2
(4) Pooled "Barro"  regression  using per capita growth rates
LS  // Dependent  Variable  is LSPC  Number  of  observations:  283
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERPOR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  0.1015168  0.0197857  5.1308283  0.0000
LGDPPC  -0.0155429  0.0028198  -5.5119P51  0.0000
PRIM  0.0002455  6.469E-05  3.7955829  0.0002
SEC  0.0004337  9.322E-05  4.6527473  0.0000
SGOV  -0.0488336  0.0204781  -2.3846737  0.0178
BLCK  -0.0388459  0.0048094  -8.0771068  0.0000
DUM60  0.0278901  0.0037380  7.4611895  0.0000
DUM70  0.0232782  0.0033872  6.8724279  0.0000
R-squared  0.435391  Mean  of dependent  var  0.018928
Adjusted R-squared  0.421019  S.D. of dependent var  0.029249
S.E.  of  regression  0.022256  Sum  of squared resid  0.136213
Log  likelihood  679.3560  F-statistic  30.29465
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
LSPC  Per capita growth rate, least squares by decade (Summers-Heston  1991)
LGDPPC  Log of initial per capita income, beginning of decade (Summers-Heston (1991))
PRIM  Primary enrollment, beginning of decade (World Bank)
SEC  Secondary  enrollment, beginning  of decade (World  Bank)
SGOV  Share of government  consumption  in GDP (Summers-Heston  (1991))
BLCK  Black market premium, average over decade (Levine-Renelt  (1992), World Bank)
DUM60  Dummy variable  for decade of 1960s
DUM70  Dummy variable  for decade of 1970s21
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Table 1:  A report card for the Gang of Four
percentile  rankings  of Gang of Fourfor variables  in growth regressions,  wvhere  100 is
the mostfavorablefor growth
Barro (1991)  growth regression,  1960-85  (110  observations).
Hong  Korea  Singa-  Taiwan
Kong  pore  (China)
Per capita growth, 1960-85,  higher than:  99%  98%  100%  95%
Fitted value of per capita growth from  94%  75%  99%  86%
Barro regression higher than:
Growth  residual  from Barro  regression  97%  98%  99%  94%
higher than:
Magnitude  of growth residual  2.66%  2.91%  3.02%  2.06%
Primary  enrollment, 1960  higher than:  56%  58%  91%  63%
Secondary school enrollment, 1960,  65%  71%  76%  72%
higher than:
Share of government  consumption  in GDP,  100%  61%  91%  18%
60-85, lower than:
Deviation of investrnent deflator from US,  48%  16%  39%  49%
1960, lower than:
Revolutions  arnd  coups, 1960-85,  lower  100%  19%  100%  64%
than:
Assassinations  per capita,  1960-85,  lower  100%  36%  100%  38%
than:
Initial per capita income, 1960,  lower than:  29%  73%  28%  71%28
Table 2: Probability of a country
attaining a miracle (froni Barro
regression)
Miracle ckeltuzecl  as > 5 percent  per'
capita  growvth,  1960-85  (actual





Cyprus  29.73 %
Greece  27.31 %
Guyana  24.45%
Portugal  23.81 %
Hong Kong  23.49%
Finland  22.86%
Belgium  20.41 %
France  20.24 %
Mauritius  18.78  %
Jamaica  18.57 %
Malaysia  17.07%
Paraguay  16.90%




Barbados  12.61  %













Table 3:  Another  report card for the Gang of Four
percentile rankings of Gang t/'Four for variables in growvth
regressions, where 100  is the mostjivorable  for  growttrh
Levine-Renelt  (1992) regression.
Hong  Korea  Singa-
Kong  pore
Per capita growth, 1960-89  (World  97%  98%  99%
Bank)  higher than:
Fitted value from Levine-Renelt  84%  87%  99%
regression higher than:
Residual  from Levine-Renelt  98%  99%  92%
regrassion  higher than:
(Magnitude  of growth residual  3.13%  3.23%  1.69%
Investment/GDP  60-89 higher than:  92%  80%  100%
Population growth 60-89 lower than:  59%  65%  69%
Initial income, 1960, lower than:  30%  63%  36%
Secondary enrollment, 1960, higher  64%  70%  75%
than:30
Table  4:  A linal report  card for the Gang of Four
percentile  rankings  of Gang  of Fourfor variables  in growth regressions,
where 100  is the mostfavorablefor growth
Other  common  variables  in growth regressions.
Hong  Korea  Singa-  Tai
Kong  pore  wan
War casualties  per capita 1960-88  100%  100%  100%  100%
(EKPS 1993)  lower than:
Government  education  16%  75%  41%  45%
spending/GDP  higher  than:
Ratio of consolidated  public  sector  3%  23%  52%  72%
investment/GDP  (Easterly-Rebelo
1993)  higher than:
Ratio of income  earned  by top 20  51%  77%  65%  87%
percent  to income  earned  by
bottom  20 percent  (Clarke  1992)
lower than:
Ratio of trade to GDP, 1960-88  98%  43%  99%  #N/A
(Summers-Heston  1985  international
prices) higher than
Ratio  of M2 to GDP, 1970  (King-  #N/A  64%  93%  #N/A
Levine 1993)  higher  than:
Average  black market  premium,  100%  49%  77%  99%
1960-89  (Fischer 1993), lower than:
Central government  deficit  #N/A  77%  97%  MN/A
(Easterly-Rebelo  1993) lower than:
Inflation  (percentage  change in the  74%  42%  95%  #N/A
Consumer  Price Index, 1970-88)
lower than:
Terrns of trade gain weighted as  13%  39%  5%  #N/A
percent of GDP (EKPS 1993)
higher than:
Other  performance  indicators.
Ratio  of private  investment  to GDP,  98%  92%  91%  58%
1960-88  (Easterly-Rebelo  (1993))
higher thar:
Percentage rate of decline  in  95%  81%  93%  97%
under-5 mortality rates, 1965-85
(Sen 1993)  higher  than:
Consumption  growth per capita,  98%  92  %  90%  #N/A
1960-88  (World Bank)31
Table 5: Before the miracle: historical
statistics on Asian economies
Per capita  growth, 1900-50
Dragons:
South Korea  0.10%
Taiwan  (China)  0.40%
Other  Asian miracles:
China  -0.30%
Indonesia  -0. 10%
Japan  1.00%
Thailand  0.10%3
Table 6: Ranking of regions in 1963 according to factors favorable or  nifavorable for development
Per capita  income  Population  pressure  Econ  omflic  culture
Mostfavorable  Latin America  sub-Sahara  Africa  Latin America
_Middle  East  Latin America  Middle  East
sub-Sahara  Africa  Middle  East  sub-Sahara  Africa
Leastfavorable  Southeast  Asia  Southeast  Asia  Southeast  Asia33
Table 7:Growth residuals of Gang of Four in
pooled growth regressions, 60s 70s and 80s
60s  70S  80s
Levine-Retnelt (1992)  regress'os,)n  wvah WOr/d  Bank per
capita  g'rovth rates
Hong Kong  2.57%  3,98%  4,07%
Korea  2.02%  3.97%  3.75%
Singapore  2.83  %  2.24%  2.06%
Levine-Renelt  (1992)  regression with  Wor/d  Bank  per
i'.)rker  growth rates
Hong Kong  1.90%  3.35%  3.72%
Korea  1.86%  3.48%  4.71%
Singapore  2.80%  0.19%  0.45%
Barro (1991)  regression  using S-H v. 5 growtil  per
ceapita
Hong Kong  3.03%  2.70%  4.44%
Korea  2.17%  2.87%  3.62%
Singapore  0.28%  2.06%  3.45%
Taiwan (China)  1.93%  2.33%  2.78%
Barro (1991)  regression  using S-H v. 5 per worker
growtil  rates
Hong Kong  2.11%  1.35% 4.28%
Korea  1.28%  2.19%  2.85%
Singapore  -0.43  %  -0.29% 3.85  %
Taiwan  (China)  2.46%'  1.20%  1.68%3;
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Note: three  letter World Bank country codes in parentheses (also used in Summers-Heston  1991).35
Figure 2
Change  in  grovAh  msidual  in  second  period
against  residual  in  first  period
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Barro  regression  -S-  H 1991  per worker  data)36
Footnotes
'The case for market-friendly  and outward-oriented  policies is made by Balassa  (1991), Krueger (1985, 1990),
Thomas and Wang (1993), Chenery  (1988), World Bank (1993b), and numerous  others. The case for
intervention  ("getting  prices wrong") is made in varying degrees  by Amsden  (1989, 1991)  and Wade (1989,
1990). Somewhere  in the middle  are Kihwan  and Leipziger  (1992), Pack and Page (1993), Pack and Westphal
(1986), Page and Petri (1993), Stiglitz  (1992), and World Bank (1993a). Other authors stress education
(Birdsall  and Sabot (1993)), stable real exchange  rates (Kim (1985), Balassa  (1987)),  political stability (Hofheinz
and Calder (1982), Haggard (1989, 1990)),  low inequality  (Krueger (1990), Haggard (1989)), macroeconomic
stability (Collins (1990). Nam (1988)),  foreign investment  (Romer  (1993), Parry (1990)), and Confucian  culture
(Kahn  (1979), MacFarquhar  (1980)).
2These  numbers  are taken from the number  of references  generated  by a search request for the country's name in
EconLit, the CD-ROM  index  of articles in economics  journals by the Journal of Economic  Literature.
3I have benefitted  from the similar exercise of Barro and Lee (1993) in identifying  the best and the worse in
economic  growth.
4The others that are ranked  as high as the Four are Malta and Japan in the Barro exercise and Botswana  and
Yemen in the Levine-Renelt  data. Japan is not in the Gang of Four because it has a separate, reverential  status;
Botswana,  Malta, and Yemen  are presumably  less celebrated  because  they are tiny, not in a coherent region,
and/or subject to peculiar  circumstances.
5The regression is (t-statistics  in parentheses):  Growth  60-85 =  .023 (3.3) - .0000055 (-4.8) Initial income,
1960 +  .027 (4.87) Primary enrollment,  1960 + .032 (2.80) Secondary  enrollment,  1960 - .0035  1.67)
A sassinations  per capita 50-85 - .0247 (-4.05) Revolutions  and Coups 60-85  -.0688 (-2.66) Government
Consumption  60-85 - .0063 (-1.26)  Investment  price deviation, 1960.  110  observations,  R2=.502. Standard
error =  .014.  The regression differs slightly from that reported in Barro (1991) because  the sample is larger.37
6The lower the predictive  power (the lower the R-squa.red)  of the growth regression, the larger is the expected
magnitude  and rank of the residual for the countries  thai have the largest growth rates iii the sample. The
expected  value of the residuals  of the countries  wit.i the largest growth rates is always positive for any R-
squared less than one.
7The  t-distribution  is used for the probability  distribution  of the residual  divided by the standard  error of the
regression.
8Among  the many examples  of models  with multiple  equilbria: Krugman (1991), Becker, Murphy, and Tamura
(1991), and Kremer (1993). The development  literature hias  long described  mechanisms  for virtuous and vicious
circles.  Birdsall  and Sabot (1993) use the virtuous circle -netaphor  to describe self-reinforcing  processes  of
rising education,  fertility decline, and rapid growth in East Asia.
MThe  regression, which is reproduced  exactly  as in the original source except for scale factors, is (t-statistics  in
parentheses): Per capita growth  60-89 = -.0083 (-0.98) -0.385 (-1.72)  Population  Growth  60-89 +  .174
(6.53) Investment/GDP  60-89 +  .032  (2.46) Secondary  Enrollment  1960 - .0035 (-2.52) GDP per capita
1960,  102 observations,  R-squared =  .463, Standard  error of regression = .0139.
°As Levine and Renelt (1992) note, investment  is likely to be endogenous  and so is less of an explanation  of
high growth than a corollarv of it.
'However, macroeconomic  iiistability  may be poorly measured  by average inflation  and average  government
deficits. Analysis  of time series of macroeconomic  indicators may uncover  other dimensions  of the quality of
macro management  (like the response  to shocks), and the Four may look more exemplary  in such an analysis.
Bruno (1993)  discusses  how in many  non-East  Asian middle income developing  economies, "the deep crisis of
the 1970s  (and even more in the 1980s),  and the delayed adjustment  to the external  shocks, had and must still
keep having a very marked effect on long-run  growth." (p.40)
1 2Specifically,  we generate  a random variable  that is the sum of a Normal (0,1) -- the cross-country  variance --
and a Normal (0,2) -- the time series variance. The realization  of the cross-country  prccess stays the same38
between  successive  periods, while  there is a new realization  of the Normal  (0,2) each period. The correlation
coefficient  between  the two periods will be 1/3. The simulation  was for 120 observations  for 100 time periods.
We then calculated  the number  of repeated  successes  (the same  observation  twice in the upper decile)  for 50
independent  pairs of time periods.
13Qther  authors also urge caution on the NIC's ,.rospects. World Bank (1993a)  notes comiing  infrastructural
bottlenecks  and the need for financial  sector reforms. Krueger (1990) and Balassa  and Williamson  (1990) argue
that continued  rapid growth will require greater trade liberalization. Lehmann  (1992) suggests  that competition
from the next tier of NIC's will slow down the original Four.  Hong (1993) argues that unless tax reforms are
instituted  in Korea to reduce incentives  for speculation  and improve  distribution, growth will be slowed  by
internal  conflicts and waste of resources.
1 4 Quoted  in Hoselitz  (1952),  p. 215.
"The  last three predictions  are taken from Hicks (1990).
1 6The World  Bank quotes,  including  the preceding  one on Korea,  are taken from  World  Bank (1993), pp. 14-15.
17Kamarck  (1967)  quoted  in Easterly,  Kremer,  Pritchett,  Summers  (1993).
18a quote  via Lipton  and Sachs (1992),  p. 250.
1 9The original Barro (1991)  regression used the previous version of Summers-Heston  (1988). We use the newer
one because it goes up to 1988  instead  of 1185.
20Barro and Lee (1993) also show unstable  residuals  for the Four Tigers in separate regressions  for 1965-75  and
1975-85,  even using per capita  growth rates (based on Summers-Heston  1988 -- version 4).  The particularly
low residuals  for Singapore  in our results are again suggestive  confirmatirn for Young's (1992)  conclusion  that
productivity  growth in Singapore  was zero.  Kim and Lau (1993)  fail to reject the hypothesis  of zero TFP
growth for all of the NIC's except Taiwan.39
211f  the variance  of the residuals  is unchanged  each period (which appears to be roughly the case), then the
expected  value of the correlation  coefficient  across decades is the same as that of the Beta coefficient  from
regressing  the residual on the lagged  residual. The regression of the change in the residual  on the level of the
lagged residual will yield a coefficient  of Beta - 1.
221f  we use per capita instead  of per worker growth rates, then the Four Dragons  would be at the upper
boundary  of the downward  sloping blob of points in the figure.  Using  the Levine-Renelt  residuals  does not
change  the graph or the conclusions. The graph shows the change in decade residuals plotted against  the lagged
decade residual for each country, so that for any given country there would be two points: the residual's change
from the 70s to the 80s against the residual in the 70s, and the residual's change from the 60s a  the 70s against
the residual  in the 60s.
23Others have also pointed  out that a "Confucian  ethic" that has been around for millenia is not a terribly
convincing  explanation  for an economic  surge beginning  after 1960. Cf. Stiglitz  (1992).
24See Rauch (1992)  and Glaeser, Kallal, Sclieinkman,  and Shleifer  (1992) for suggestive  evidence  of strong
externalities  within cities.  C.ccone and Hall (1993)  argue that density in itself has a strong productivity  effect
across U.S. states.
51  am indebted  to Lant Pritchett for making  this point.
6Anaheim's per capita  growth is from Greenwood,  p. 74, which gives the nominal  growth in median  family
icome (which  of course is not exactly "per capita" -- if family size was lower in 1960  than 1950,  then per
capita growth would  be higher). I deflate it by U.S. CPI inflation  for the 50s (which may  overstate Anaheim's
real growth since inflation  was probably  higher in a booming  area).Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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